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Abstract: This article analyzes the strategy and rhetoric of the National Federation of 
Settlements’ 1928 project on unemployment. During the Hoover years settlement workers 
assembled an extensive catalog of case studies, which offer a glimpse into the home life of the 
jobless and their families at the beginning of the Great Depression. From their research the NFS 
Committee on Unemployment published a series of books and articles that depicted the 
unemployed as the undeserving victims of economic change, and called for policies to protect 
them. Throughout, settlement workers focused on the families of the unemployed, drawing on 
gendered notions of work and family and lifting up policies that protected male breadwinner 
households. Thus, settlement leaders re-cast unemployment as a social, rather than an economic, 
problem. In all, settlement research, writing, and reception presented a skeptical voting public 
with a palatable argument for social insurance that brought the experiences of the jobless to the 
voting public and to policymakers, demonstrating a process of “policymaking from the middle.” 






“It is going to take a great deal of educating,” settlement worker Helen Hall wrote to 
Pennsylvania Governor Gifford Pinchot, to clear away the fog in the public mind caused by that 
one small word ‘dole.’”1 Hall’s lament is unsurprising. After spending years working with other 
reformers on the issue of unemployment, Hall was intensely aware that suspicions of jobless 
workers were entrenched in American society. Moreover, Hall reflected a collection of ideas on 
unemployment that were common among settlement workers at the beginning of the Great 
Depression. Even before the economic crash, members of the National Federation of Settlements 
argued that the plight of the unemployed was thoroughly misunderstood by the American public, 
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and that it was through changing public opinion that settlement workers could affect social 
welfare policy. Hall’s sentiments were the outgrowth of years of work on doing just that. 
Beginning in 1927 the National Federation of Settlements had committed funds and time 
to study unemployment, and to advocate for the regulation of the labor market and the relief of 
the unemployed. Through the NFS Committee on Unemployment, settlement workers and their 
allies proposed an argument in favor of unemployment relief, regulation, and insurance that was 
accessible to average Americans and that explicitly connected changes in industry with changes 
in workers’’ lives. Their research rested on a survey of over 300 unemployed families across the 
nation and was showcased in two books and a series of articles. The first book, published in 
1931, was Some Folks Won’t Work, a popular-press account of unemployment written by a 
nonfiction writer named Clinch Calkins. The second was Case Studies of Unemployment.2 
Published in 1932, Case Studies presented their research findings for social scientists to examine 
and draw on. Helen Hall wrote one forward, as did another member of the Unemployment 
Committee: Paul Kellogg, who was the editor of the landmark social welfare journal, Survey 
Graphic. 
Members of the Unemployment Committee entered a debate over social policy that had 
developed at the beginning of the century and centered on what was called “social insurance.”3 
Social insurance, as reformers discussed it, included health insurance, old age insurance, 
workers’ compensation, and unemployment insurance. Yet while policy experts and reformers 
had been debating specific proposals to protect the unemployed, many Americans had only 
recently begun to consider unemployment as an involuntary condition. Settlement workers in the 
Unemployment Committee believed that although economists, policy experts, and reformers had 
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long been discussing unemployment, their arguments were largely esoteric to average 
Americans. 
Settlement workers proposed to change how social policy experts and American voters talked 
about unemployment, in several ways. First, the NFS Unemployment Committee offered 
“average” Americans a digestible argument for regulating labor and providing for the 
unemployed. Second, the NFS Unemployment Committee aimed to humanize unemployment to 
persuade American voters and policymakers. They did so by offering personal stories that 
introduced their readers to plight of the jobless, a strategy that proved the pervasiveness of 
joblessness even in good times, and persuaded average Americans of the need to protect – rather 
than condemn – unemployed workers.  
In these two features, a look into the Unemployment Committee offers a path to 
understanding social and social policy change that complicates the existing scholarship. Research 
on the Progressive Era and the New Deal has, in general, argued that large-scale social policy 
emerged from a few possible places. First, historians like Colin Gordon and Peter Swenson place 
the engine of policy change in the hand of “corporate liberals:” class-conscious liberal capitalists 
who recognized that regulation and unionization could provide order and build demand, and thus 
worked closely with politicians to craft legislation that would placate workers and bring order to 
industry. As Peter Sweson described them, these “business-financed New Deal Democrats” (like 
GE’s Gerard Swope) “insisted that unemployment insurance was good business and not merely a 
system of charitable payments to unfortunate workmen.”4 Second, scholars like Theda Skocpol 
and Edwin Amenta emphasize the importance of existing bureaucratic structures and state-level 
programs in social welfare (like Civil War pensions and widows pensions), as well as 
Progressive concerns over corruption, in shaping social policy.5 Finally, others see the social 
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welfare policies of the interwar period as a response to social protest. Whether they see social 
policy as a genuine response to the needs of laborers or as a means of containing popular 
upheaval, scholars like Lizabeth Cohen, Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward agree that 
worker agitation prompted policy change.6 
Settlement workers, more than other reformers, offer a look at social policy change that can 
be described as “history from the middle.” While the common narratives offered place the engine 
for policy change either at the level of government or at the level of organized workers, 
settlement workers serve as a reminder that policy change was a dynamic process, and that the 
impetus for change often came from the middle. Settlement workers in the 1920s drew on their 
direct experiences with workers in daily life to influence voters and policymakers on the need for 
unemployment legislation. Thus, these reformers demonstrate policy as shaped by reformers who 
understood both the demands of workers and the priorities and abilities of legislators. This 
process can best be seen in their campaign for unemployment regulation and relief.7 
Settlement workers also aimed to provoke change on unemployment by drawing on 
traditional conceptions of family and work. Members of the Unemployment Committee bolstered 
their defense of unemployment regulation by echoing popular arguments for a “family wage” – a 
wage for a male breadwinner that could support the whole family – and thus reflected gendered 
conceptions of labor and family. The NFS Unemployment Committee argued that the labor 
regulations and unemployment insurance championed by pre-war reformers and economists 
would primarily protect hardworking families that were headed by male breadwinners. In their 
study on the home life of the unemployed, these reformers drew on maternalist notions of female 
dependency in order to placate readers that might otherwise have bristled at the thought of 
government support for the unemployed. 
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In a few ways, this study of the NFS Unemployment Committee confirms research on the 
family wage and maternalism. Scholars have rightly noted that maternalist reformers, whether in 
casework or in the Children’s Bureau, employed essentialist notions of femininity to create 
avenues for leadership and professional development, all of which had the effect of codifying 
female dependence into social work and social welfare legislation. Moreover, historians studying 
the family wage have lamented that scholarship in fact frequently replicates the myth that women 
were naturally suited to the home rather than the workplace.8 As Alice Kessler-Harris argued, 
this scholarship resulted in “an empirical literature rooted in the need to justify women’s wage 
labor activities as a product of economic necessity.”9 In other words, historians need to be more 
prepared to interpret women’s labor as willing and fulfilling. Indeed, well-known settlement 
workers like Chicago Commons’ Lea D. Taylor supported arguments for unemployment 
insurance that emphasized the dangers of female employment, all while nurturing a successful 
career in reform. And the Unemployment Committee unabashedly described women’s work as a 
“makeshift,” the unfortunate product of intense economic need. 
Yet the Unemployment Committee also implies that a more nuanced analysis of maternalist 
reform and the family wage is in order. While settlement workers echoed the ideological 
defenses for the family wage, the Unemployment Committee’s work suggests a more 
complicated interplay between ideology and pragmatism. In the height of the Great Depression, 
settlement workers expressed an acknowledgement that women’s labor was not rewarded 
sufficiently, and contended that the most effective way to ensure that entire families could 
survive the crisis was by bolstering the labor market for men. Moreover, because of widespread 
unemployment, the NFS Unemployment Committee took on the unusual task of defending relief 
for men. Relief and charity had long been considered the safety nets of paupers, women, and 
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children, but in the 1930’s NFS participants and settlement workers around the nation claimed 
that relief was the right (though temporary) of men victimized by industrial confusion. 
Settlement workers hoped that, whether through relief or unemployment regulation, men might 
be able to again earn enough that their wives would not have to work multiple jobs and care for 
their families. Certainly members of the Unemployment Committee espoused an ideology of 
essential female dependency, but they did so in response to intense practical concerns. 
In the end, settlement workers like Helen Hall proposed that the most effective strategy to 
protecting the unemployed was to induce the voting public to demand a change in policy. As 
members of the Unemployment Committee put it, their task was “to have material ready in order 
to create public opinion and stimulate public action.”10 Thus, they used their research first, to 
educate American voters on the plight of the jobless (and in this they rarely discussed specific 
policies), and second, to educate policymakers and call for relief and social insurance. In the 
process, they both redeemed unemployed workers from the stigma of pauperism and 
reinvigorated a long-popular defense of family wage and the male breadwinner household. 
Through their work in the Unemployment Committee, these settlement house workers 
established new priorities for the settlement movement and took an active role in re-shaping the 
debate on unemployment legislation and social policy.  
 
Changing Public Opinion on Unemployment 
In 1928 settlement workers and reformers, many of whom who had long made urban 
working neighborhoods their homes, determined that their next project should be centered on 
growing unemployment. Like many reformers, these settlement workers believed that reaching 
voters was a crucial step in achieving legislative change, and presented themselves as the group 
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most equipped to understand unemployment and to recommend its solution. While the NFS 
ultimately endorsed plans for unemployment insurance, their primary goal at first was generating 
empathy for the unemployed, and creating a demand for unemployment relief and labor 
regulation. The NFS Committee on Unemployment, created at the 1928 conference of the NFS, 
orchestrated a nation-wide survey of unemployment in United States industrial centers and 
promised to position workers at the center of the conversation. With research and writing 
settlement leaders promised to humanize unemployment, prove the pervasiveness of joblessness 
in good times, and persuade Americans that workers deserved large-scale and federally 
administered measures to prevent and deal with unemployment. 
Other reform organizations had already established campaigns for unemployment insurance 
and regulation, but settlement workers hoped to shift the conversation to workers themselves. 
The most notable was the American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL), which by 1913 
was, according to Daniel Rodgers, “the most active and important social insurance lobby in the 
United States.”11 Established in 1906, the AALL initially drafted model legislation for 
government-funded unemployment insurance. By the 1920s the AALL leader John B. Andrews 
turned to an alternate model of regulation that emphasized prevention and enjoined employers to 
lead the way in stabilizing the labor market.12 Through the 1920’s the NFS supported the 
AALL’s work (and, indeed, Jane Addams served as a Vice President for the Association), and 
NFS members likely concurred with the AALL leadership’s contention that reform workers 
could mitigate class conflict by working with both labor and industry. Yet, when the NFS 
committed to studying and campaigning for unemployment legislation, its leaders created a 
campaign that was solely committed to advocating for, and speaking from the perspective of, 
workers themselves.13 
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Moreover, while settlement workers were new to the conversation on unemployment, they 
argued that their close experience with vulnerable workers made them an especially good fit for 
the task. They were the descendants of a Progressive-era movement that was famous for 
establishing community-based houses in cities throughout the urban north (the most famous 
being Hull House in Chicago). Locally, settlement workers moved into these houses and 
established themselves as “good neighbors” to the economically disadvantaged, largely 
immigrant populations among whom they lived. On the national level, settlement leaders from 
Jane Addams to Lillian Wald successfully pushed for municipal and labor reforms in the early 
twentieth century.14 
In the wake of the First World War settlement workers led by Philadelphia’s Helen Hall 
asserted that the Federation should use its intimate knowledge of workers and connections to 
policy makers to address the issue of unemployment.15 Hall led the National Federation of 
Settlements as an experienced neighborhood worker. A graduate of the New York School for 
Social Work, Hall served as the director for University Settlement, a large settlement house in 
Philadelphia. At University Settlement Hall witnessed the frequency with which her neighbors 
reported joblessness, and the increasing difficulty that many of them had in finding work. The 
“closeness of the settlements to their neighbors,” Hall reflected in 1959, “made them aware of 
mounting unemployment even in 1927-28, … a time supposedly of wide prosperity.”16 As Hall 
explained to the NFS, settlement workers were ideal for carrying out two lines of action: “one to 
stir up governmental thought and action along the lines of unemployment insurance, and second 
to bring out the human effect of the lowering of the standard of living and various methods of 
relief.”17 
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The establishment of the Unemployment Committee indicated that the NFS would shift its 
priorities while maintaining strategies for engaging in social issues. Members of the NFS voted 
the Unemployment Committee into action on the same day that they halted the work of the 
Prohibition Committee, yet they also voted that the Unemployment Committee would take “as a 
model the organization and procedure of the Prohibition Committee. By securing money for 
research on joblessness, Hall shifted the attention of the NFS, from vice to jobs. Moreover, the 
Unemployment Committee became so significant to the NFS that it was ultimately transformed 
into the Unemployment Division, which housed various efforts related to unemployment 
throughout the 1930’s. Hall and members of the Unemployment Committee believed that if they 
could educate the public and policymakers about pervasive joblessness, then surely legislation to 
protect the unemployed would follow.18 
Their daily interaction with poor workers, and their history of relating structural problems to 
personal consequences, rendered them ideal to make real headway on the issue of unemployment 
insurance. Paul Kellogg, who was the editor of the popular social work journal, Survey Graphic, 
served on the Unemployment Committee as an ally of the settlement movement. In a letter to a 
fellow writer Kellogg declared, “while various agencies, from the Senate Committee on 
Education and Labor to the Industrial Relations Counselors, are tackling the problem from one 
angle and another, the settlement study has distinction in its canvass of consequences in terms of 
intimate household and family experience.”19 In short, settlement workers and their allies thought 
settlements the optimal place to carry out such a study. 
In order to change public opinion, the committee undertook a large-scale research project 
of the unemployed in settlement neighborhoods. Their research was grounded in a series of 300 
household “pictures” collected by settlement workers at 104 settlements from 32 cities and towns 
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in 21 states, and supplemented by analyses of group discussions and an unemployment-themed 
essay contest. These resources would, the committee hoped, offer a more human-centered 
description of the economic system than most Americans had seen. In the Unemployment 
Committee members’ presentation to the NFS Executive Committee they were clear about the 
purpose of the study, to create a domino effect: from stories, to education, to action. 
Hall and the others on the committee20 relied on a strategy of presenting personal stories in 
the packaging of social science research to make the case for social insurance.21 The committee 
began with an extensive survey of unemployment in the nation. Between 1927 and 1930 they 
developed a research plan, recruited settlements and community organizations to participate, 
collected their findings, and assembled those findings into publishable material. In 1928 Hall and 
the ten-member Executive Committee began writing a survey, which they hoped settlement 
houses around the country would fill out and send back to them.22 These surveys asked 
settlement house workers to transcribe the stories of at least five families suffering from 
unemployment, to lead and take notes on settlement discussion groups on unemployment, and to 
collect from their neighbors’ essays on life with unemployment. In order to acquire such 
materials, the Executive Committee set up a Field Committee, comprised of nineteen settlement 
workers who found settlements to fill out surveys, and then reminded, cajoled, and pressured 
leaders in these settlements to collect and return research materials. In the end the committee had 
around three hundred case studies, a substantial body of research on which to base their 
arguments about unemployment and social insurance. In 1929 Albert Kennedy of the NFS 
Executive Committee explained that their study would “reveal the social consequences of 
unemployment as found in certain neighborhood families which have been intensively 
studied.”23 
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By focusing on stories and anecdotes telling the “social consequences of unemployment,” 
settlement workers hoped to resonate with the kinds of Americans who were unmoved by 
economists. The household pictures they offered depended on a specific relationship common 
between settlement workers and their neighbors, in which settlement workers considered their 
neighbors as research subjects and delved into their personal lives. These were consensual 
interviews, and unemployed families often demonstrated an appreciation for such a study, but 
settlement workers’ methods also relied on a system that filtered and at least partially assessed 
the unemployed. The committee was upfront about this strategy, even in publication. “It is 
common to regard the unskilled laborer statistically,” Calkins lamented in Some Folks Won’t 
Work. “He is not a person,” she continued. “He is a unit of production. … Yet if we see them in 
their homes, making the struggle which differentiates us from the earthworm, can we still regard 
them without empathy?”24 Writing to a public audience, Calkins framed their quasi-scientific 
methods as an especially appealing part of their work, because the stories of the unemployed 
would reach a previously untouched audience. 
Calkins’ work exemplifies the part of the unemployment study that aimed to galvanize 
popular opinion, yet the Committee hoped that they could reach two distinct audiences: an 
educated, middle-class readership, and social science researchers. Their two books were thus 
aimed at these two groups of people, who settlement workers believed were necessary in the 
project of establishing social service legislation. The more general work, with the catchy (and 
perhaps misleading) title Some Folks Won’t Work, guided readers through a description of 
unemployment: its causes, the “makeshifts” used by its victims, and its long-term consequences. 
Even though the aptly titled Case Studies of Unemployment incorporated far less interpretation 
than Some Folks Won’t Work, Hall and Paul Kellogg each provided an introduction that spelled 
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out their arguments about unemployment. In the years following its publication, moreover, Hall 
and the NFS aimed to use Case Studies to influence legislators at the state and federal level to 
pass legislation for the unemployment relief and insurance. Hall also wrote numerous articles 
based on their research, for journals with an educated, middle-class readership, including Survey 
Graphic and The New Republic.25  
By using relatable language, by focusing on the workers and their families, and by drawing 
on gendered ideas of family organization, settlement leaders suggested that the unemployed were 
not to be viewed with suspicion, and the government was not exempt from the problem. 
 
The Settlement Case for Social Insurance 
The public debate over unemployment insurance emerged in the beginning of the century and 
captivated reformers, economists, and industrialists into the 1920’s. While policy experts and 
reformers frequently used the term “social insurance” – an umbrella term encompassing health 
insurance, old age insurance, compensation for injury, and unemployment insurance – all of 
them addressed unemployment specifically and drove the debate over unemployment legislation. 
The concept of unemployment itself, which implied that some jobless people were involuntarily 
so rather than paupers or loafers, was fairly new to most Americans. Yet, beginning in 1909, 
especially in light of European systems of social insurance, economists and social scientists 
began to question the wisdom of expecting low unemployment in a healthy market. By the 
twenties a small but significant group of intellectuals had produced studies of unemployment that 
suggested that it was an endemic problem of industry.  
Settlement leaders argued that the ideas put forth by established economists and social policy 
experts were too esoteric to reach the kinds of average Americans who, they said, could sway 
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public policy. Economists like William Beveridge and William Leiserson both proposed that 
organized labor markets, state-administered labor exchanges, and public works projects would be 
able to predict and manage periods of unemployment, proposals that the NFS campaigners 
echoed. For economists and policymakers who had long understood unemployment to be 
sporadic and unexpected, Beveridge and Leiserson’s recommendations included solutions that 
were far more interventionist than had previously been favored.26 Leiserson argued that 
economic measures, such as labor exchanges, unemployment insurance, and targeted public 
works projects, could go a long way in regulating employment and making the most of the labor 
market.27 Yet, Unemployment Committee members recognized, their arguments were largely 
inaccessible to non-experts. Beveridge’s Unemployment: A Problem of Industry was an 
intimidating 317 pages long, and its eleven chapters and four appendices included topics like, 
“The Sources of Information: the unemployed percentage,” and “Cyclical Fluctuation: Alternate 
rise and fall of average unemployed percentage in periods of years.”28 While some specialists 
were captivated by Beveridge’s recommendations, many Americans likely struggled to even 
understand them.29 
The Unemployment Committee aimed to reshape the kinds of proposals put out by Beveridge 
and his contemporaries, in order to make them accessible and compelling to American voters and 
policymakers alike. Written for audiences that seemed slow to embrace social insurance, Some 
Folks Won’t Work and Case Studies of Unemployment were based on the premise that the United 
States economic system, even when functioning smoothly, contained cracks through which 
hardworking and well-intentioned workers and their families could easily fall. They argued that 
too many Americans believed that unemployment was only a problem of “hard times,” a sign of 
a faltering economy, from which workers would recover when the market righted itself. With 
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that in mind, the committee members structured their research and writing with an attention to, 
“the inadequacy of our scheme of protecting such families against the hazard of unemployment 
in normal times.”30 While the encroaching depression certainly gave purchase to their books, this 
was the crux of their argument: unemployment was an unavoidable side effect of the American 
economic system, one that industrial and political leaders had thus far not dealt with. In other 
words, Hall later described, the significance of their research “was not that it was a measure of 
the mass unemployment which has roused our American communities to action in hard times, 
but of an evil to which, for the most part, they have been blind when times were good.”31 
The subtext of this argument was that the escalating depression was not the only (or primary) 
instigator of unemployment, so the solution to unemployment needed to address regular bouts of 
joblessness.32 Paul Kellogg, in the “Foreword” to Case Studies of Unemployment, explicitly 
differentiated between the big crisis – which he said was complicated and would attract the 
attention of economists, financiers, and statesmen – and regular, cyclical unemployment. “We 
should distinguish,” he said, “between the grand strategy of overcoming the causes of business 
depression (and its resulting mass unemployment) and the tactics of closing in on unemployment 
as a recurring and measureable risk of modern production.”33 Unemployment as experienced by 
workers and their families was, he argued, simpler and more manageable than the economic 
crisis, and warranted immediate action. While their recommendations would not solve the 
economic crisis, Kellogg said, they would “cut down the bulk of unemployment … and bring an 
orderly easement to wage-earning households which now bear the brunt of this recurring and 
measureable risk over which they have no control.”34 
Beyond characterizing unemployment as part of a functioning economic cycle, Kellogg 
actually described it as the product of modern industrial development, and as warranting equally 
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modern solutions. In a 1929 letter he explained that “The settlement group is the only body of 
social workers to as yet face the fact that we are dealing with something different from the old 
unemployment of hard times – we are dealing with the new unemployment of technical change 
and progress.”35 Hall echoed Kellogg’s sentiments in the introduction to Case Studies, writing 
“Experience has taught us to recognize broken work not merely as a symptom of financial crises, 
but as a recurring fault of modern production.”36  
To emphasize modernity as more significant than the emerging depression Kellogg, Hall and 
Calkins focused on the detrimental effect that technological advancements and consumer fads 
had on workers. News butchers, who sold newspapers on trains, saw their work disappear with 
the advent of bus travel in the 1920s, and ticket choppers became obsolete as turnstiles were 
installed at train and subway stations. Calkins described musicians who played in theater 
orchestras and found themselves out of work with the development of the Vitaphone, which 
could show pictures with sound. What should we do, they asked, for the skilled maker of wire 
hat frames who suddenly finds that women no longer want to wear his hats? And can we expect 
the ice cutter to easily transition to another skill when refrigerators have become widespread?37 
Even for those employed in seemingly timeless occupations, the NFS studies argued, 
seasonal slackness could halt otherwise steady employment. Settlement workers (erroneously) 
described the farmer as an independent laborer who could prepare for the seasonal ups and 
downs of his work, and they argued that industry should be held to the same standards as 
agriculture. Expert finishers (who provided interior finishing on wood and walls) and wood-
cutters, they suggested, should be able to expect their bosses to prepare for slack times.38 
If unemployment was a side effect of modern production, committee members claimed, a 
modern system should be able to manage it. In the same way that industrial leaders protected 
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their raw materials, it was a waste to allow their labor supply to rot in a down cycle. When an 
experienced longshoreman found himself unemployed because of the winter chill, his employers 
were not just subjecting him and his family to a reduced income, but they were also wasting a 
precious commodity and allowing it to go unused. Indeed, Kellogg shamed industrial and 
political leaders for their mismanagement of such resources. Kellogg wrote satirically: “If we 
were to take a leaf out of the modest proposal of Dean Swift and organize a Society for Wasting 
Labor Power & Gutting the Wage-Earning Market, it would promote exactly our present-day 
policies of irregular employment and would set its cap for an occasional cyclical depression.”39 
Working in corporations that had used scientific management to boost wages while still making a 
profit, laborers had every reason to expect their employers (or the government) to manage 
periods of high unemployment. And modern business, Kellogg and Calkins claimed, should have 
the capacity to manage their labor power through predictable lulls in demand. 
Above all, the books placed the responsibility on employers and the government – rather than 
the unemployed – to ease the effects of joblessness. Unemployment was neither the fault of the 
jobless, nor should they be expected to muddle through it unaided. The ultimate burden of 
unemployment, Calkins declared, “falls upon men least able to bear it and frequently upon those 
in no way responsible for its incidence.”40 Calkins offered perhaps the most pointed analogy, 
which suggested that it was up to the federal government and employers (rather than workers) to 
protect the victims of economic downturns. Referencing the widely popular workman’s 
compensation legislation, which had at that time passed in most states, Calkins described 
industrial unemployment as a parallel problem to industrial accidents. Just as with industrial 
accidents, unemployment was a problem that employers should attempt to prevent and respond 
to. Not only did this analogy place the onus of managing unemployment outside of the hands of 
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workers themselves, it also rendered unemployment as a fully treatable condition. The solution, 
as the proposed it, would be a combination of economic planning and stabilization, and “some 
form of protection for families caught by the dislocations of work which we fail to control.”41 
Disregarding what they saw as an unwarranted faith in political leaders, members of the 
Unemployment Committee called for change in social policy. A temporarily unemployed 
worker, they argued, should be able to count on the government, employers, and private agencies 
to make the best use of their labor. In their books, Hall and Calkins both called for three steps to 
safeguard workers: first, the regularization of production as enacted by employers; second, a 
system of public works projects that could step in when private industry failed; and third, a 
federal employment system that could coordinate and modernize state and municipal 
employment agencies. This line of action, Hall explained, was “to modernize our public 
employment services, to lift the standards of private agencies, and to weed out the abuses and 
inefficiencies of our present haphazard methods of labor placement.”42 In addition, Hall called 
on the NFS to push for greater legislation related to unemployment insurance and relief, as in 
1932, when the NFS published a resolution stating that it “expresses its conviction that 
unemployment insurance is essential to preserve a minimum standard of economic security; and 
that it urges the governor of every American state to press for the enactment of … measures to 
protect American standards of living at their most vulnerable point.”43 While their 
recommendations were often somewhat unspecific, the Committee’s main goal was to catalyze 
business and government involvement. 
When Hall made her case she reflected the hallmarks of the settlement campaign for social 
insurance: 
No one who scans the ups and downs of American business enterprise, our changes in 
techniques and styles and markets, the shiftings of industry from one region to another, 
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can but see that there will still be need for protection of some sort against unprevented or 
unpreventable unemployment over which the worker himself has no control.44 
 
Workers were helpless in the face of technological change, consumer demand, and standard 
economic cycles, they argued, and thus deserved the protection of the state. Perhaps most 
importantly, though, the settlement campaign for social insurance insisted that this social policy 
was about workers themselves, not the labor market. 
 
Unemployment in Families 
To persuade their readers that economic cycles warranted legislative change, Committee 
members humanized the plight of the jobless by shifting the conversation out of the workplace 
and positioning it in the home. Anticipating readers who perceived of unemployment as an 
impersonal issue of job placement, left to labor and business analysts, Calkins wrote a narrative 
of good families trying to survive a catastrophe, and suggested that unemployment’s real victims 
were families, not industrial leaders or even just laborers. In so doing, the Committee 
reconstituted the jobless: once perceived as paupers and loafers, workers in this telling (and their 
families) were the hapless victims of changes outside of their control. 
A central goal of the work was to exonerate the unemployed for their condition, a difficult 
task given that their readership was fundamentally suspicious of the jobless. Some Folks Won’t 
Work directly challenged the popular myth that “if a man really wants to work, he can find it.”45 
This myth served as an undercurrent of much public resistance to social insurance, and dispelling 
it became central to the Committee’s work.46 Calkins opened Some Folks Won’t Work with a 
description of the kind of person who was influenced by such misinformation: an insurance agent 
who, because of the mystifying nature of the economy, genuinely believed the worst of the 
unemployed. “I tell you there isn’t any such thing as being idle for people if they have any 
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gumption,” Calkins claimed such a person would say, “Some people won’t work. I’d like to see 
anybody keep me out of a job.”47 The average working American, Calkins’ anecdote suggested, 
was ignorant regarding unemployment. Yet her tone offered readers the opportunity to become 
someone other than this insurance agent. As Calkins described, the agent believed the 
unemployed were unwilling to work, in spite of the availability of jobs. With a better sense of the 
causes of unemployment, Calkins implied, the reader would likely come to see the situation quite 
differently. 
The NFS Committee members acted on the belief that “average” Americans misunderstood 
the causes and pervasiveness of unemployment, a suspicion that was made manifest even by 
other settlement workers. In Columbus, Ohio, the Gladden Community House opted out of 
participating in the study because of their faith in the current system of managing unemployment 
– in which the jobless relied on private agencies and spurts of state and federal assistance, often 
channeled through private agencies or public bureaus of charity. C.H. Bogart, the Gladden head 
resident, informed Irene Nelson that, “President Hoover will undoubtedly conduct through 
governmental channels a study of unemployment in which settlements are in a unique position to 
cooperate.”48 Bogart and his allies seemed to maintain faith in ad hoc government responses to 
poverty, and implied that the Committee was stepping out of line in their work.49 
Even more pernicious, Hall soon discovered, was the popular belief that in the 1920s most 
people without jobs were unemployed for personal reasons like injury or illness, or could expect 
to be employed again soon. Nelson quoted one settlement caseworker as saying, “These spells of 
unemployment don’t last; if a man amounts to anything he can always get work…”50 Nor did 
they believe that it was possible to be unemployed and employable at that time. Hall, unphased, 
brushed off this skepticism as the reaction of a “Case Hardened” Family Case Worker, someone 
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who had seen enough dishonesty to distrust anyone requesting aid.51 To Hall and Unemployment 
Committee members, the presence of dissention within the NFS was not surprising, and 
indicated the extent to which average Americans misunderstood joblessness.  
Thus, Calkins clued her readers into the great disconnect between secure Americans and the 
unemployed, an argument that emphasized the invisibility of the jobless and the fallibility of 
popular conceptions about the unemployed. One story she told, which she described as the 
“ironic niceness of the incident which lately occurred in a public school of Philadelphia,” offered 
her readers a chance to be self-aware and to adopt behaviors to distinguish themselves from 
those in denial about unemployment. Calkins described, “an undernourished child [who] was 
given by the school doctor a medicine to whet her appetite,” a solution that (in Calkins’ telling) 
would usually denote concern for the well-being of a student. “As time went on,” Calkins 
continued, “and she continued to give evidence that she was not eating enough, a visit was paid 
to her home. There it was discovered she had little to eat.”52 This description of misguided 
assistance assured readers that, yes, even good people could miss the prevalence of 
unemployment. As such it both educated readers and affirmed their fundamental goodness. 
To further disassemble misunderstandings about unemployment, Calkins and the NFS 
introduced secure Americans to a category of deserving poor: the unnecessarily jobless. In Some 
Folks Won’t Work Calkins argued that the poor families they aimed to protect were hardworking 
and worthy of assistance. “There are many of these who would rather starve than accept charity,” 
Calkins informed the reader. “Unfortunately, physical laws break down their natural hauteur, and 
charity makes its hateful entrance through sick relief, perhaps.”53 Charity, Calkins stated, was far 
from a first solution. Over numerous chapters she described a sequence of “makeshifts,” steps 
that the unemployed took to get by. The jobless were tireless at “hunting the job”: answering ads 
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in the paper, walking miles in search of work, and paying often untrustworthy private 
employment agencies to find work for them. At home they sold valuables like furniture and 
engagement rings, moved into cheaper housing, and even split up the family among extended 
family members or invited additional renters to bear the housing cost. Charity was often a last 
resort. These makeshifts made up the bulk of Calkins’ popular press argument about 
unemployment: the unemployed and their families were not sitting around and waiting for the 
government to bail them out. They were thrifty, industrious, and still barely surviving.54 
The task of finding and highlighting “worthy” poor families became central to the 
Unemployment Committee’s strategy for changing popular opinion about unemployment 
insurance. Believing that unemployed families – especially those who had not previously relied 
on charity – represented an invisible or misunderstood segment of the poor population, 
Committee members made it their duty to expose the nation to these men and women. “I am 
convinced,” Nelson confessed to Hall, “that there is a whole stratum of the population who are 
really having the devil of a time and about whom absolutely nothing is known – they have kept it 
all under their hats, or at least within the circle of a few obscure and inarticulate friends.55 By 
characterizing their subjects as formerly unseen, and as previously unknown to social service 
agencies, Nelson preemptively excused any future forays into charity as unusual and necessary – 
these families acted from blameless desperation and not from a place of dependence. 
The Committee’s research strategy reflected their commitment to exonerating the “right” 
kind of jobless individuals, and they thus chose to publish only the stories of the “blameless 
poor” – men who were capable and willing to work – and their families. When the Committee 
requested case stories from settlements they offered this as a suggestion to head-workers. “Cases 
should be chosen,” they recommended, “in which the wage-earner through suffering from 
 22 
continuous or intermittent unemployment, is still considered employable.”56 Over and over they 
articulated what kind of family they wanted to rely on. As Hall counseled Lea Taylor,  
the test I applied was simply this: is or was the unemployment due to causes 
entirely outside the family’s control and are there definite consequences which 
can be set down and described as fact? As you say, we shall have to search for 
families in which unemployment is not interwoven with other factors in 
producing their present situation.57 
 
This specific targeting of the “best” of the unemployed reveals that despite their progressive 
understandings of persistent unemployment, the settlement Unemployment Committee mobilized 
some rather traditional notions about the poor in order to defend jobless workers. They 
demonstrated the deservedness of jobless workers by highlighting their lack of dependence on 
charity. When Irene Nelson described the five “best” families she had run into, she commented 
to Helen Hall that “It is interesting that not one of my five is known to any charitable 
organization, and this without my having specified that we should prefer the sort.”58 Thus the 
Committee paradoxically contributed to a discourse about poverty that associated accepting 
relief with failure, a seemingly unintentional byproduct of arguing that poor workers in the 
1930’s were not to blame for their predicament.59 
If one of the features of faultless poor workers was that they had never relied on charity, then 
committee members connected being independent with deserving aid. In a letter to a discouraged 
Irene Nelson, Helen Hall offered consolation that revealed her strategies and beliefs about relief. 
Nelson had written complaining of the resistance she faced from caseworkers at family-centered 
social service agencies, who argued that their clients did not fit the requirements that Nelson was 
looking for. “In taking the Family Case Workers reaction,” Hall counseled, “we must realize that 
they get the type of family which we do not want particularly to include in our work.”60 In other 
words, Family Case Workers, who were more likely to see domestic disputes, juvenile 
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delinquency, and other “behavioral” issues, would likely not see many of the worthy poor who 
would make solid cases for study.61  
Hall’s subsequent thoughts more clearly indicate the intellectual consequences of shaping 
their study around the “best” unemployed families. “I think that we of the Settlements feel,” she 
explained, “that almost the keenest suffering and the greatest change of standards come often in 
the family which does not resort to the relief giving agencies.”62 The Committee’s strategy, then, 
required that they establish markers for this kind of person, such as prior requests for aid or a 
relationship with a family service agency. “Our settlement study,” Kellogg explained to readers 
of Case Studies of Unemployment, “sought to disentangle the unemployed from the 
unemployable by dealing only with families whose predicament was due to industrial causes 
outside their control.”63 The Unemployment Committee intentionally structured their research 
project so as to defend the unemployed against judgment and to show that such families accepted 
charity only as a result of a systemic failure. In effect, the Committee was distinguishing 
between the kinds of people who should be supported by unemployment insurance and those 
who should not, and Calkins carried these implications into publishing.  
The NFS Unemployment Committee turned their attention to families in order to persuade 
their readers of the importance of unemployment regulation. By focusing on families rather than 
just the labor market, Calkins compelled readers to acknowledge and respond to the plight of the 
unemployed. The economic system (seasonal slackness, technological innovation, and periodic 
downturns) rendered individuals unemployed, and they and their whole families struggled to 
survive. “Clearly whether unemployment is controllable or uncontrollable,” Calkins stated by 
way of conclusion, “its ultimate burden falls upon men least able to bear it and frequently upon 
those in no way responsible for its incidence. Most of the great modern nations have provided 
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their workers with some form of insurance against such unemployment. We have not.”64 
Moreover, the NFS Unemployment Committee suggested that a breadwinner’s joblessness 
carried consequences for the entire family, and perceived of the family as the social unit in which 
people experienced unemployment, rather than as individuals, or collections of workers, or 
communities.65 In this, the Unemployment Committee humanized jobless workers, in the process 
recasting them as victims, rather than paupers. 
 
Preserving the Male Breadwinner Family 
Beyond merely emphasizing families, the Unemployment Committee proposed a specific 
definition of “family” that would have been amenable to their readers, and which established 
employment as fundamentally male. By emphasizing widely accepted conceptions of the male 
breadwinner family structure, the Committee could argue for government intervention in dealing 
with unemployment (social insurance) without alienating their readers. This rhetorical strategy 
likely reassured readers of the non-radical nature of their campaign, and demonstrated that 
federal insurance would preserve, rather than revolutionize, the American social fabric.66 Thus, 
these reformers drew on Progressive “maternalist” policies, which emphasized female 
dependence and the state’s obligation to preserve the male breadwinner family structure. 
For Settlement researchers, the right kind of family was also one that affirmed a family 
structure centered on a male breadwinner. In a recorded roster of 148 case studies, the 
researchers organized it around each family’s breadwinner. Each family was titled according to 
its (male) breadwinner, and catalogued by nine categories: name, case number, nationality, sex, 
age, vocation, last occupation, others earning (like children or women), and dependents. They 
only listed 10 female breadwinners, even though 43 wives made it in the category of “others 
 25 
earning.” It is perhaps a given that none of the women who were listed as breadwinners had 
husbands as dependents, and it would be anachronistic to expect married women to be listed as 
breadwinners. The structure of this roster, though, proves the narrative that Hall and settlement 
workers were trying to tell: that whole families were suffering because of an economic condition 
that attacked (male) breadwinners specifically. In presenting this narrative they set up a social 
ideal – that men were breadwinners even in families in which their wives and children worked – 
that did not necessarily reflect the reality of increased female employment throughout the 
twenties.67 
The Settlement study echoed a longstanding discourse in the United States about motherhood 
and wage labor. In the 19th and early 20th centuries many laborers and reformers concurred that 
families benefitted most from a breadwinner model, in which fathers worked and mothers were 
able to focus on mothering. This was the American iteration of maternalism, defined by Sonya 
Michel and Michael Koven as "ideologies and discourses that exalted women’s capacity to 
mother and applied to society as a whole the values they attached to that role: care, nurturance, 
and morality.”68 Scholars have long emphasized the significant role that maternalist ideology 
played in Progressive-era reform work (especially, even, settlement work). For reformers, 
notions of gender difference offered avenues for professional advancement. As Robyn Muncy 
effectively argued, reformers drew on common notions of womanhood, and asserted themselves 
(as women) as naturally positioned to create policy that affected women.69 For the targets of 
reform, maternalist policies were often imbued with middle-class, white sensibilities, and 
inflected women with the same notions of inherent nurturance and, ultimately, dependency.  
Much of maternalist social welfare work simultaneously reflected and shaped a labor market 
that gave preference to male labor, a pattern that bolstered calls for a family wage. Progressive 
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reformers influenced by maternalism partnered with labor leaders like Samuel Gompers of the 
American Federation of Labor and the John R. Commons of the American Association of Labor 
Legislation to establish a wage by which men could earn enough in wage labor to support his 
wife and children. As Martha May argued, family wage advocates worked to challenge “the 
ideology of working-class poverty” by removing women from the workforce, thus 
simultaneously (in theory) boosting wages and allowing women to practice “true womanhood.”70 
The product of reformers’ emphasis on the male breadwinner family was that their policies 
codified dependency among working-class women. By the 1920s, minimum wages tended to be 
higher for men than women, while working or working-class women were expected to rely on 
charitable aid when their circumstances prevented them from receiving the security of a male 
breadwinner family.71 
The NFS study of unemployment echoed the maternalist preference for male breadwinner 
households. From the study’s framing, NFS researchers advocated a system of employment that 
centered on men and discouraged women’s work. In the chapter on “Makeshifts” in Some Folks 
Won’t Work, Calkins put a mother’s employment as virtually the last makeshift that a family 
might turn to during times of unemployment  – listed after selling goods, borrowing, living on 
credit, and even eating less. In a 1932 conference, Hall suggested the same. After describing how 
families cut down on food, she explained: “There is still another reserve that the family found 
within itself [this comes after “cutting down on food”]. The mother goes to work – for she can 
often get a job when the man cannot.” What’s interesting here is that Hall connects this – a 
seemingly cultural argument about women working – with their larger argument regarding the 
nation’s industrial and financial structure. “When the bankers and industrialists, the engineers 
and managers have not, in their organization of industry, enough work for the men” Hall 
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continued, “enter Mrs. Jenkins, Mrs. Levy, Mrs. Carbino and the rest.”72 Women worked as a 
last resort, and their employment indicated a failure in the economy rather than a successful 
adaptation to new conditions. 
In part, the Committee’s work offers a reflection of common assumptions among working 
class families themselves, that the male breadwinner family was preferable. One of Irene 
Nelson’s favorite family stories, that of the Clark family from Philadelphia, nicely illustrates the 
role of gender in conversations about unemployment. Frank Clark described his life without 
work for a caseworker: “You see it’s because I’ve always worked so steady that I’ve got nervous 
about being out of work now,” making him a perfect candidate for their study. Clark emphasized 
both his resistance to letting his wife work, and the reality that it may be necessary. “I don’t 
believe in my wife working,” he said, “although she did when I didn’t know it during the year I 
was away, and paid the first money on our house out of what she saved.” Nelson understandably 
hoped that the Clarks might find some relief, but what’s interesting is that when she expressed 
this sentiment to Hall she wrote “Poor Mrs. Clark! – let’s hope her story may stir people to do 
something about unemployment.”73 In one sentence, then, Nelson laid out her belief that women 
unfairly bore a significant portion of the burden of unemployment, even though they were not 
expected to be breadwinners. Moreover, by positioning Mrs. Clark as the victim, Nelson’s 
lament suggested that a woman’s employment was part of the problem, rather than a possible 
solution. 
Scholarship on the family wage frequently centers on the ideological arguments that 
reformers used to defend male breadwinner households. As Martha May has shown, a significant 
number of reformers agreed with Florence Kelley, who said in 1912: “It is the American 
tradition that men support their families, the wives throughout life, and the children at least until 
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the fourteenth birthday.”74 This tradition, scholarship suggests, was bound up with ideas about 
appropriate and ideal gender roles. Historical accounts focused on labor organizers, reformers 
focused on Mother’s Pensions, and a variety of individuals concerned with the effects of 
industrialization on the family, frequently explain the focus on the family wage and women’s 
depressed wages as a product of women’s “special relationship to the home.” National bills like 
the Sheppard-Towner Act and state-by-state legislation like Mothers’ Pensions were thus aimed, 
explains Primilla Nadasen, at returning women to their “proper – even sacred – domestic role.”75 
Maternalist policies for social welfare and labor reform thus expressed an ideology rooted in 
what perceived innate gender roles, and positioned women as fundamentally domestic and 
dependent.76 
Reformers advocating for male breadwinner households, moreover, cautioned that when 
women worked they upset gender norms and put their families at risk. According to Allan 
Carlson, Catholic thinkers like Father John Ryan and Progressive reformers like John Spargo and 
Annie Daniel all argued that women’s work could be blamed for evils like child malnourishment, 
infant mortality, and juvenile delinquency.77 Settlement workers were certainly not immune to 
maternalist sensibilities. In 1910 Jane Addams decried that "the long hours of factory labor 
necessary for earning the support of a child leave no time for the tender care and caressing which 
may enrich the life of the most piteous baby."78 Such language reveals the extent to which these 
reformers – often single, often childless, always professional – expected poor women to embody 
longstanding traits of “true” womanhood, for the sake of their children.  
In many ways, the National Federation of Settlements’ Unemployment Study does confirm 
scholars’ assessment of maternalism and the family wage. Much like scholarship that presents 
reformers as warning that working mothers put their families and children at risk, the stories 
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presented in Some Folks Won’t Work were harrowing examples of what could happen to 
hardworking, faultless families when the job market shifted and their male breadwinner was 
rendered jobless. In an article for the Chicago Daily News Graham Taylor warned that men 
without work would inevitably lose the respect of their families and their own self-respect. 
“Faith in him changes to hope, to fear, to suspicion, to judgment that he is no good,” Taylor 
lamented. “He grows sullen, curses, begins to drink, turns against the good, the law, the 
government—and before he knows it he drifts into crime.”79 Moreover, in Some Folks Calkins 
argued that without the regulation of unemployment, women and children were vulnerable to 
overwork, exhaustion, and even serious ailments. Expecting women to bear the financial burden 
of unemployment, they argued, was akin to sending them to their graves, and their families to the 
poorhouse.80 
The NFS support of a male-centered household, though, came from practical concerns, and 
as such challenges scholars of maternalism and the family wage to take more seriously the 
complicated interplay between ideology and material reality. They clearly knew that in working 
class households women regularly supplemented (or provided alone) the family income, but they 
cautioned against it for practical reasons. As she described the tendency of women to earn less 
than men, Calkins offered the common explanations for paying women less: “Her physical 
inferiority made her less widely useful when arm power counted, for there were fewer kinds of 
things she could do. Her physical cycles made her emotions unsteady. And most of all she had, 
even if only a legendary one, a husband or a father to support her. She could work for pin-
money.”81 Calkins relied on common stereotypes about women’s abilities and temperament not 
to justify their limited wages but to explain to readers why a family could not (and should not 
have to) rely on a female breadwinner. But without protections and social insurance for the 
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unemployed, women would have to continue to work for miserly compensation, only 
perpetuating the income disparity. Calkins lamented that “novels could be written about this 
particular period in unemployment – the almost invariable shift of wage-earning from the man’s 
to the woman’s shoulders because women will work for less pay.”82 Thus, a mother working 
indicated a drop in family income – a very material problem that warranted action.  
The NFS Committee drew on the widespread commitment to a male-breadwinner household 
to advocate for regulation on unemployment. As these statements demonstrate, members of the 
Committee echoed ideas of difference in order to rectify a real practical problem: that the labor 
market prohibited women from earning enough to make the difficult work worth it. Members of 
the Unemployment Committee recognized that women were in fact paid less (largely because 
employers thought women were less suited to industrial labor than their husbands), which 
rendered them the primary beneficiaries of a generous policy for social insurance. While Some 
Folks in some ways emphasized women’s natural suitability for domestic life, it was in large part 
the reality that an employed mother would not earn enough for her family drove the 
Unemployment Committee to count men as breadwinners, and the male-centered family as ideal. 
Therefore, it is a mistake to assume that supporters of the male breadwinner household did so for 
purely ideological reasons. 
Some Folks also made claims to the dangers of women working, but they did so without 
emphasizing women’s responsibility to care for their families, and thus exhibited a less 
ideologically laden analysis of women’s work. Rather than focusing solely on the dangers that 
female employment bore for children, according to Calkins, the dangers posed by a family’s 
dependence on female labor went beyond the family economy, to a mother’s health. Because 
working mothers frequently remained responsible for much of the housework, settlement 
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workers rightly suggested, a working mother was likely a wearied woman. The books tried to 
deal with the very real, physical consequences of a woman working – that she found herself 
cleaning at nights and cleaning, cooking, and child-rearing during the day. Hall said that “the 
stories abound in the results of the double load on their shoulders:” exhaustion, illness, and 
sometimes death. One working mother, described in Case Studies on Unemployment, was only 
able to sleep by resting her head on the kitchen table between work and cooking, while her son 
sat beside her. The problem of the double load faced by working women led settlement workers 
to dig in on social insurance policies that bolstered male breadwinners.83 
The books reflected the practical reality that women bore the burden of domestic care, and 
seemed to confirm that a mother working would endure alarming physical ramifications. Almost 
every time that Calkins described a wife working, the story ends with the wife becoming 
extremely exhausted and sick. In Some Folks Won’t Work, stories of mothers forced to work tell 
of the horror that came from it. A settlement worker told of one Polish woman who was “driven 
out to do cleaning,” causing her health to spiral. Calkins’ telling reads as a warning to any 
woman considering work, and as a confirmation to stalwart supporters of male centered 
households: “The blood in her veins shone blue through her ghostly skin, and her eyes, a purplish 
blue, seemed fixed upon a point in space where the Philadelphia courts, squalor, starvation, and 
the kindness of neighbors were all as one. She was too tired to hear.”84 Exhaustion was but a 
symptom compared to what other mothers suffered. Mrs. Shanti, who came from Russia, was 
forced to work long hours to support her family. But “overwork and nerves wrecked Stacia’s 
health,” Calkins told, “and a tumor developed in her breast.” According to Some Folks, Mrs. 
Shanti was not alone in suffering from job-related ill-health. One Mrs. Daly, Calkins described, 
found herself in bed with cancer from her job as a nighttime janitor: what began as a lump from 
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hitting her head in an office she was cleaning, developed into a tumor, and then threatened her 
life. It was from the very physical act of working as a cleaner that Mrs. Daly developed cancer.85 
In the end, the members of the NFS Unemployment Committee offered a narrative for 
unemployment that cast women as dependent, and thus defenseless in the face of joblessness. 
The circumstances of the Depression and the insufficiency of women’s work to provide for a 
family prompted these reformers to push the boundaries of relief, by charging that the failures of 
the relief system put families at greater risk for destitution and suggesting that relief not be 
reserved solely for women. In the process, the Unemployment Committee both confirms and 
challenges research on maternalism, demonstrating that ideology and material need often went 
hand-in-hand in defending the male breadwinner household. In other words, the solution they 
proposed was intended to improve the conditions of women, but functioned to cement in 
unemployment regulation the prerogatives of the male breadwinner family, and the ultimate 
dependence of women and mothers. By calling for a sweeping, yet non-radical responses to 
cyclical unemployment the Unemployment Committee articulated a position that could catalyze 
change without scaring off middle-class, educated Americans. 
 
Reception and Outcomes 
In the wake of finishing their survey of, and writing on, unemployment settlement workers 
embarked on the dynamic process of bringing workers’ voices to legislators and policy experts. 
Their priority was to translate the difficulties of unemployment to lawmakers, so they focused 
their attention more on personal stories than specific policy. By reaching out to the voting public, 
contacting politicians, and continuing to work with the unemployed, settlement workers created a 
“middle-out” method for policy change. 
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Among the voting public, the Unemployment Committee’s research was received quite well, 
and Some Folks Won’t Work certainly made its way onto the nightstands of educated, reading 
Americans. Reviews by sympathetic readers emphasized the positive impact that such a study 
could make on the campaign for unemployment insurance. Paul Douglas, an economist whose 
research also dealt with unemployment, wrote an ad for the book that aimed right at such a 
readership. 
If the settlements and Miss Calkins do not cut through the stiff hide of middle-class 
indifference with these moving chronicles of heroism and human loss, then there is no 
hope for the improvement of the world by pity.86 
 
The Chicago Daily Tribune echoed Douglas’ description, if much more briefly, and in 1930 
Some Folks Won’t Work made it onto the Tribune’s best book list (along, it should be said, with 
136 other books).87 By 1931, Some Folks Won’t Work was into its fourth edition and, according 
the Unemployment Committee, “selling steadily.”88 
Settlement leaders took their research to the voting public through various other mediums. 
Graham Taylor, though not a member of the Unemployment Committee (but the father of Lea D. 
Taylor) published a compelling piece in the Chicago Daily News, simultaneously advertising and 
explaining the arguments presented in Some Folks Won’t Work. For a largely conservative 
readership, Taylor described the pitiable state of joblessness and warned of the danger of 
inaction. “A man respected by wife and children gradually loses their respect and his own self-
respect as he fails to be their bread-winner,” Taylor lamented.89 In January of 1932 Helen Hall 
continued to reach out to the public in a lecture given in Detroit, Michigan. As the Detroit News 
described it (in an article that also expanded her audience), Hall explained to the audience that 
the first job of industry and the government is “stabilization of employment,” and continued by 
advocating or “long time planning of public works.”90 In this, Taylor and Hall thus acted on the 
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settlement commitment to translating knowledge of the unemployed to a middle-class, voting 
audience. 
The Committee used a few methods to translate this knowledge to policy makers and 
politicians. In 1931 Congress debated the Wagner Bill S. 3060, which would have created a 
federal employment exchanges to regulate unemployment, and the Unemployment Committee 
worked feverishly to lobby for its passage. The meeting minutes of the Committee reveal that its 
members believed that “only sufficient pressure from [the] country will bring [the bill] to a 
hearing before March 1st,” and soon after committee members exhorted settlement workers from 
around the country to press their representatives for action on the bill.91  
Members of the Unemployment Committee also directly appealed to legislators and 
policymakers. After the publication of Some Folks Won’t Work Helen Hall sent a copy to 
Frances Perkins, the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Labor, and soon after 
met with Samuel Joseph (of the College of the City of New York), Perkins, and Paul Kellogg, to 
discuss strategies for passing Wagner’s bill.”92 Then, in 1932, Hall and other members of the 
Unemployment Committee traveled to Madison, Wisconsin, to support the passage of the 
Wisconsin Unemployment Insurance Bill (the nation’s first), recognizing that, as Hall said to the 
NFS, “It is not a model bill, indeed its chief virtue is that it could be passed. Its terms had to be 
conservative.” A few months later Hall testified before a commission in Columbus, Ohio, that 
aimed to pass a more robust bill for unemployment insurance.93 By the end of 1932 the NFS was 
clear on the role that settlement workers could take in securing legislation, stating in a resolution:  
“Whereas, the National Federation of Settlements, Inc. has already endorsed the 
principle of unemployment insurance, be it resolved that we now re-affirm this 
stand and urge all our members at this time to throw the weight of their conviction 
toward expediting the passage of appropriate laws in their respective states.”94 
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Hall personally positioned herself to make recommendations to policymakers. Early in 1931 
she used her newfound position as an expert on unemployment to urge Pennsylvania Gifford 
Pinchot to organize a state committee on unemployment, and pushed for statewide labor 
exchanges.95 Hall also served on a Philadelphia task force that made recommendations for long-
term structural reforms, and advised well as NY Senator Robert Wagner as he wrote a series of 
bills calling for public works for the unemployed. A strongly worded letter written by Helen Hall 
on behalf of the NFS to President Roosevelt received warm reception. Perhaps most 
significantly, in 1934, when President Franklin Roosevelt issued an executive order creating the 
Committee on Economic Security, Helen Hall and Paul Kellogg both sat on its Advisory 
Council. In these capacities, Hall was able to convey the experiences of the unemployed to 
policymakers.96 
Settlement workers in the Unemployment Committee, however, maintained their intimate 
connection with unemployed workers themselves. At the city level, committee member Lea D. 
Taylor spearheaded efforts to manage unemployment in Chicago. Taylor helped to orchestrate 
citywide public hearings on unemployment, in which hundreds of individuals impacted by 
unemployment testified to the deprivation and social disorganization they experience. In concert 
with Chicago’s Worker’s Committee on Unemployment, reformers and labor activists 
orchestrated in a successful campaign for state funding for the unemployed. 
This research complicates standard perceptions of the settlement house movement. Much of 
the available scholarship suggests that, in the wake of the First World War and in the midst of 
growing emphasis on professionalization, settlement house workers embraced casework over 
reform. Moreover, virtually none of this research discusses how conceptions of gender shaped 
settlement workers’ perception of unemployment and the growing financial crisis. Robyn 
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Muncy’s Creating a Female Dominion in American Reform, for instance, takes gender seriously 
but positions settlement reform as happening at the federal level. Clarke Chambers’ classic 
Seedtime of Reform offers a counter to this position, demonstrating that settlement workers’ 
“persistent crusading” sped the process by which lawmakers proposed and legislated policies on 
social insurance, but neglects to analyze the precise arguments they made for social insurance, 
particularly with relation to gender. By bringing research on maternalist reform into conversation 
with scholarship on the settlement house movement, it becomes clear that settlement house 
workers both played a role in social reform even while providing support in the form of 
casework, and that through it all they embraced gendered notions of work, the family, and the 
role of the federal government. 97 
Their work also complicates the way we might think about the creation of policy on labor 
and welfare. Settlement workers in the 1920’s and 1930’s demonstrate that policy change did not 
come primarily from below (although the unemployed workers’ movement was quite significant) 
or from above (for instance, policy makers and the federal government). Rather, social policy 
change was something that happened in the middle – among reformers who could translate the 
experience of laborers for the voting public and political leaders. This point offers a counter to a 
popular narrative about Progressive social politics: that, as Daniel Rodgers put it, “What 
ultimately put social insurance back on the agenda in the early 1930’s was …the quiet, structural, 
behind-the-scenes institutionalization of European-acquired social insurance knowledge in the 
key university economics departments and policy centers.”98 Hall herself was at least 
tangentially related to many of these economics departments, as she had close relationships with 
both Paul Douglas and Paul Kellogg. 
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It would be a mistake to overstate their influence on policy details, as settlement workers 
were not primarily invested in shaping specific pieces of policy. Settlement workers like Hall 
understood their purpose as providing a link between jobless workers and legislators, for their 
specialized knowledge lay in the personal experience of the unemployed, not the nuances of 
social policy. Thus, they worked to educate policymakers on the very human issue of joblessness 
rather than crafting legislation, to persuade more people (voters, legislators) to support social 
insurance. To be sure, settlement workers had opinions on policy – for instance, in a 1935 report 
regarding their work on the Advisory Council Hall and Kellogg reflected dismay that they were 
not able to shape the Social Security Act to include stronger state standards and a greater federal 
contribution.99  
But their work significantly played a role in ensuring the passage of, broadly speaking, 
policies to protect the unemployed. So, for instance, while they clearly favored the Ohio plan 
over the Wisconsin plan, settlement workers threw their weight behind both, because they both 
intended to arrest destitution among the unemployed. And their weight proved to be influential. 
As NFS meeting minutes report, committees in Wisconsin, Ohio, and Congress (such as the 
LaFollette-Costigan committee) all asked for and drew on the Unemployment Committee 
research in crafting policy. This fits their goals: it is striking that Hall (and Kellogg and Douglas, 
for that matter) believed that a project to change public opinion was crucial for gaining 
legislation on unemployment. 
Because they re-centered debates for unemployment insurance onto jobless workers’ 
families, the Unemployment Committee was able to introduce to their economically illiterate 
readers the natural cycles of a capitalist economy. At the same time, they catalyzed the creation 
of empathy among the voting public, enabling voters to fully understand the plight of the jobless. 
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Yet their argument came at a cost, for it relied on a distinction between the jobless who deserved 
unemployment insurance, and those who had long relied on charity. Well before the New Deal, 
settlement workers recommended that some poor Americans were “entitled” to government 
assistance, and thus contributed to the creation of the two-tiered welfare state.100 
By holding the economic system to task while mobilizing the rhetoric of male breadwinner 
families, settlement workers presented fairly radical recommendations for dealing with 
unemployment (social insurance) alongside traditional and widely accepted conceptions of social 
structures, which reassured readers of the non-radical nature of their campaign and demonstrated 
that federal insurance would preserve, rather than revolutionize, the American social fabric. 
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